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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL AND APPEAL 
The issues before the Court on this Cross-Appeal and 
Appeal are twofold: 
(1) Did the trial court err When it interpreted the 
Utah Product Liability Act statute of rlepose, Utah Code Ann., 
Section 78-15-3 (1953), to be a statute of limitation which 
extended the two-year limitation on Wrongful death actions 
otherwise mandated by Utah Code Ann., Section 78-12-28 (1953)? 
(2) Did the trial court err in retroactively applying 
this Court's decision in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 
670 (Utah 1985), which held the Utah Product Liability Act 
unconstitutional? 
STATEMENT OF THE CAS|E 
This is a wrongful death action filed by the plaintiff 
nearly three and one-half years after the death of his wife in 
an automobile fire. Defendants Saab answered plaintiff's 
Complaint and subsequently moved for Judgment on the Pleadings, 
asserting that plaintiff's action was bartred by Utah's two-year 
limitation on wrongful death actions, Ut^ ah Code Ann., Section 
78-12-28 (1953). The Honorable Judith M. Billings denied 
Saabs' motion, ruling that plaintiff's Complaint was timely 
filed because the Utah Product Liability Act statute of repose, 
Utah Code Ann., Section 78-15-3 (1953), W4S a statute of limita-
tion which superseded the wrongful death limitation. (Appendix 
A) 
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Subsequently, defendant Ken Garff (dismissed from this 
action and not a party to this appeal) answered plaintiff's 
Complaint and moved for Summary Judgment, which the Honorable 
Peter F. Leary denied based on Judge Billings' prior ruling. 
Defendant Garff petitioned for an intermediate appeal which was 
denied. 
After this Court declared the Utah Product Liability 
Act unconstitutional in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P. 2d 
670 (Utah 1985) , the Honorable John A. Rokich, ruling that the 
decision retroactively invalidated the statute of repose, 
granted defendants' Saab Motion for Summary Judgment. (Appendix 
B) 
Plaintiff has appealed Judge Rokich's ruling on the 
retroactivity issue, and defendants Saab have cross-appealed 
Judge Billings' ruling on the applicability of the statute of 
repose. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's wife, Rhonda Luther Raithaus, died in an 
automobile fire on July 2, 1979. (R.3-4) Plaintiff filed this 
wrongful death action on November 29, 1982. (R.6) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A statute of limitation prescribes the period of time 
during which a plaintiff must bring his (her) action after the 
cause of action has accrued or waive his (her) remedy. By 
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contrast, a statute of repose immunizes a defendant from liabi-
lity after a given period of time commencing with an event 
unrelated to the accrual of the cause of action. This Court has 
implied and courts in other jurisdictions have specifically held 
that a statute of repose does not extend ^he period prescribed by 
the statute of limitation applicable to the cause of action. To 
hold otherwise would fly in the face of the Utah Legislature's 
manifest intent. 
Even if the Utah Product Liability Act statute of 
repose did supersede the wrongful death limitations statute, this 
Court's decision in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1985), declaring the Utah Product Liability Act unconstitu-
tional, retroactively applies to the plaintiff, because he 
neither relied on the statute of repose nor demonstrated that 
the inequities of applying the decisiqn to him outweigh the 
burdens created by only selective retroactive application. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The parties' respective positions on plaintiff's 
appeal demonstrate the ironic nature of this case. Contrary to 
what one might expect, the defendant manufacturers maintain 
that this Court's decision in Berry v. feeech Aircraft Corp.,717 
P. 2d 670 (Utah 1985), declaring the Utah Product Liability Act 
unconstitutional, should be applied retroactively to all cases in 
litigation at the time of the decision. By contrast, the 
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plaintiff consumer asserts that the Utah Product Liability Act 
statute of repose has continuing viability after Berry. 
This curious situation evolved as a result of the 
plaintiff's delay in filing his action and the trial court's 
novel construction of the Utah Product Liability Act's statute of 
repose. Plaintiff filed his action three and one-half years 
after the death of his wife—one and one-half years beyond the 
two-year statute of limitation applicable to wrongful death 
actions, Utah Code Ann., Section 78-12-28 (1953). Plaintiff's 
legal premise, which the trial court accepted, is that the 
Utah Product Liability Act's statute of repose, Utah Code Ann., 
Section 78-15-3 (1953), is a statute of limitation which extended 
the time in which plaintiff could file his action. 
Plaintiff's appeal is dependent on the validity of his 
premise, and if this premise is incorrect, the plaintiff's appeal 
is moot. Accordingly, defendants Saab will first address the 
issue presented by their cross-appeal and thereafter respond to 
the arguments plaintiff has presented on his appeal. 
POINT I. THE UTAH PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT STATUTE 
OF REPOSE 
NEVER 
IS NOT A 
INTENDED TO 
STATUTE 
EXTEND 
OF 
THE 
LIMITATION 
PERIOD IN 
AND 
WHICH 
WAS 
THE 
PLAINTIFF COULD FILE HIS WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION. 
A. This Court has recognized that a statute of repose is not a 
statute of limitation. 
In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P. 2d 670 (Utah 
1985), the Court noted that there are critical differences 
between statutes of limitation and statutes of repose: 
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Statutes of repose, such as sedtion 3 of the 
Products Liability Act, are different from 
statutes of limitations, although to some 
extent they serve the same endsj 
Id, at 672. A statute of limitation is designed to provide a 
reasonable period of time in which a plaintiff must bring an 
action after his (her) cause of action h^s accrued or waive his 
(her) remedy. Id. Further, statutes of limitation "are designed 
to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of 
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been 
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." 
Meyers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981) (citing Order of 
Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 
342, 348-49, 64 S. Ct. 582, 586, 88 L.Ed. 788, 792 (1944)). By 
contrast, statutes of repose are not designed to provide a 
reasonable time for the filing of an action once it arises. 
Berry, 717 P.2d at 672. Specifically, th0 Utah Product liability 
Act statute of repose was designed to immunize manufacturers and 
persons in the manufacturers1 chain of distribution six years 
after sale or ten years after manufacture of the product regard-
less of when an injury occurred. Id. at 673. The policies 
undergirding the statute of repose were the availability and cost 
of liability insurance. See, Utah Code Ann., Section 78-15-2 
(1953). Because the goals and functions of the two types of 
statutes differ, the statutes are not interchangeable. 
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B. This Court has implied and courts in other jurisdictions 
have held that a statute of repose does not extend the 
limitation otherwise provided by the applicable statute of 
limitation. 
By implication, this Court has already indicated that 
the Utah Product Liability Act's statute of repose must be 
construed together with the applicable statute of limitation: 
Section 3 of the Utah Product Liability Act 
bars actions without regard to when an 
injury occurs and is not designed to provide 
a reasonable time within which to file a 
lawsuit. Indeed, a statute of repose may 
cut off a cause of action even though it is 
filed within the period allowed by the 
relevant statute of limitations. 
Berry, 717 P.2d at p. 672. (Emphasis added.) 
If indeed, as plaintiff contends, the statute of repose doubles 
as a statute of limitation in product liability actions, the 
emphasized portion of the quote has no meaning. Although the 
quoted language is dicta, it does accord with decisions of courts 
in other jurisdictions which have specifically considered the 
issue. 
In Grissom v. North American Aviation, Inc., 325 
F.Supp. 465 (M.D. Fla 1971), a case similar to the case at bar, 
the widow of Astronaut Virgil "Gus" Grissom filed a wrongful 
death action against the defendant engineer nearly four years 
after the death of her husband. The applicable Florida statute 
of limitation provided that a wrongful death action had to be 
brought within two years of the decedent's death. Nonetheless, 
Mrs. Grissom maintained that her action was timely, citing a 
Florida statute of repose which stated that no action against a 
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p r o f i ess i o n a 1 e n g I n e e i c o u ] (I b e in a I n t a I n e d a. f t e r t w e ] v e y ears 
following the date of substantial completion of construction. 
After examining analogous statutes in other jurisdictions, the 
coin: t stated: 
This Court believes the more reasonable 
application of [section] 95.11(10) [statute 
of repose] and the only correct interpreta-
tion is that a professional engineer or 
architect is susceptible to suit for a period 
of only twelve (12) years, and that a 
plaintiff, once death occurs, has not more 
than two (2) years in which to bring suit or 
have the action barred. If death occurs or 
the defect is found more than twelve (12) 
years after completion of the work, no 
wrongful death suit could be maintained. 
Id. 468. . . 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reached a similar conclusion in 
O'Connor v. Altus, 335 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1975) while interpreting an 
analogous archi tect's statute of repose: 
As do many of its counterparts in other 
states, N.J.S.A. 2A: 14-1.1 [statute of 
repose] impliedly incorporates the tort 
limitation act generally applying to all 
personal injury actions. Hence, this state's 
two-year statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A: 
14-2, does operate to restrict the period in 
which actions can be initiated for accidents 
occurring within ten years after construc-
tion; but it does not serve to extend beyond 
ten years from the date construction was 
completed the time within which suit may be 
filed. 
For example, an action for personal injuries 
sustained by an adult in an accident oc-
curring, say, five years after the completion 
of construction still must be brought within 
two years thereafter—or seven years after 
construction. This statute does not preserve 
the remedy, in that instance, for an addi-
tional five years or until the full ten 
years from construction has elapsed. As 
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indicated, both the two-year and ten-year 
statutes are at work in that situation. The 
latter does not expand the two-year period 
of the personal injury statute. It simply 
provides that in any event the suit must be 
started within ten years of the construction, 
regardless of when the cause of action 
accrues. (Citations omitted.) 
Id. at 553. Other cases reaching the same result include Cadieux 
v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 593 F.2d 142 (1st 
Cir. 1979); Comptroller of Virginia ex. rel. Virginia Military 
Institute v. King, 232 S.E.2d 895 (Va. 1977); Smith v. American 
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation, 248 S.E.2d 462 (N.C. 
App. 1978)(overruled on other grounds). 
C. The Utah Legislature's intent in enacting the Utah Products 
Liability Act was to reduce, not extend, the period during 
which a manufacturer would be exposed to liability. 
As stated in Millett v. Clark Clinic Corporation, 609 
P. 2d 934 (Utah 1980), a case interpreting the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act, M[t]his Court's primary responsibility in 
construing legislative enactments is to give effect to the 
legislature's underlying intent." Id. at 93 6. Even a cursory 
review of the Utah Product Liability Act reveals that the 
legislature intended to enact a statute which would limit the 
liability of product manufacturers and other persons in the 
manufacturers' chain of distribution. In its declaration of 
intent, Utah Code Ann., Section 78-15-2 (1953), the legislature 
specifically referred to (1) the rising number of product 
liability suits, (2) the amount of judgments and settlements in 
these actions, (3) the rising cost of insurance premiums, and 
-8-
(4) the availability of product insurance, CI early, the 
legislature intended to provide means to limit or otherwise 
narrow the exposure faced by manufacturers and other persons in 
the distri bution cha in, . • . ,-i.\$a. .- , i - . * *ei -
pret the Utah Product Liability Act's statute of repose as 
enlarging, rather than, narrowing, the time in which a prospective 
plaintiff could bri i ig ai 1 acti oi 1 aga i nst the \ ery par ties the act 
sought to protect. 
The cour" :n Cadieux v. International Telephone & 
Telegraph Corp. , • : 142 (1st Cir. 1979), whil e exairtini i ig a 
statute very similar "• : ;v:- tah Products Liability Act, had no 
illusions regarding the Rhode Island legislature's intent: 
Finally, appellant!s argument based on the 
"solicitude of the Rhode Island Legislature 
for the unique burdens of the products 
liability victim", allegedly demonstrated in 
the 1978 amendment of R.I.G.L. [section] 
9-1-13, does not impress us. The amendment 
provides that products liability cases shall 
be brought "within ten (10) years after the 
date the product was first purchased for use 
or consumption." We do not read this 
amendment as creating a new ten year period 
to bring products liability suits. Rather, 
the amendment clearly provides that the 
ten year period after the sale of the 
offending product is an additional limit on 
suits brought within the existing statutes 
that relate to the date of the injury. If 
R.I.G.L. [section] 9-1-13 demonstrates 
solicitude for any group, it is for the 
manufacturers who, prior to July 1, 1978, had 
no statutory protection from suit that was 
related to the date of original sale of a 
product. 
Id. dt 144-I4D,, 
The Utah Product Liability Act statute of repose 
does nothing more or less than confer an immunity upon a manu-
facturer and the persons in the manufacturer's chain of distribu-
tion six years after the date of initial purchase of the product 
or ten years after manufacture of the product regardless of the 
time of injury. This statute of repose does not pretend to 
designate the time within which a plaintiff must bring an action 
once it has accrued. This is the function of the statute of 
limitation. The applicable limitation in this instance is 
the two-year limitation on actions for wrongful death, and since 
the plaintiff did not file his action within two years of his 
wife's death, his action is barred as a matter of law. 
POINT II: EVEN IF PLAINTIFF'S CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IS CORRECT, THERE 
IS NO REASON TO EXEMPT THE PLAINTIFF FROM 
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE BERRY DECISION 
WHICH DECLARED THE UTAH PRODUCT LIABILITY 
STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
A. Decisions overruling prior law are normally given retrospec-
tive effect. 
In Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), a case 
declaring the Utah Guest Statute unconstitutional, this court 
noted: 
The general rule from time immemorial is 
that the ruling of a court is deemed to 
state the true nature of the law both 
retrospectively and prospectively. In civil 
cases, at least, constitutional law neither 
requires nor prohibits retroactive opera-
tion of an overruling decision, but in the 
vast majority of cases a decision is effec-
tive both prospectively and retrospectively, 
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even an overruling decisi on. (Emphasis 
added, citations omitted.) 
Id. at 676. j The general rule Is abrogated only i i 1 those circum-
stances where a class of actual or potential litigants has 
justifiably relied on the prior law or where the burden dictates 
only prospective application. State Farm Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 27 Utah 2d 166, 493 P.2d 10 02 
(1972) and Loyal order of Moose No, 259 v. County Bd., 657 P.2d 
257 (Utah 198 2) Under the standards previously set by this 
Court, the Berry decision should be retroactively applied. 
B. The plaintiff has not demonstrated that he justifiably 
relied on the Utah Product Liability Act statute of repose. 
In State Farm Mutual Insurance Co* v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange. 27 Utah 2d 166. 4V ?.2d 1002, (1972), the Coin t stated 
the following with respect to retroactive application of a ruling 
concerning subrogation rights: 
The rule [of prospective application] is 
based upon the proposition that where 
persons had entered into contracts and other 
business relationships based upon justifiable 
reliance on the prior decisions of courts, 
those persons would be substantially harmed 
if retroactive effect were given to over-
ruling decisions. An additional factor was 
that retroactive operation might greatly 
burden the administration of justice. 
Id. at 168-169, 493 P.2d at 1003. It is clear from the foregoing 
language that prospective application applies where persons have 
consciously entered into relationships based on express reliance 
on prior law or decisions. Further cases supporting this 
proposition are as follows: Loyal Order of Moose No. 259 v. 
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County Bd. , 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982)—organizations relied on 
criteria for tax exempt property established by prior court 
decision; Timpanogos Planning & Water Management Agency v. 
Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 690 P. 2d 562 (Utah 
1984)—water district conducted business for decades on basis of 
unconstitutional selection of board members; and Rio Algom Corp. 
v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984)—taxing authorities 
set mill levies in reliance on unconstitutional statute. 
In contrast to the above cases, however, the Court has 
not accepted the reliance argument in absence of evidence of 
actual reliance, especially when the claimed reliance would not 
appear to accord with everyday experience. For example, in 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), the Guest Statute 
case, the defendants petitioned for rehearing, claiming that 
this Court's ruling declaring the Guest Statute unconstitutional 
should not be retroactively applied to them. In analyzing the 
issue, this Court stated: 
There is no evidence that the defendants 
knew of the Guest Statute and relied upon it 
in offering a ride to the plaintiff. The 
bare assertion by defendants that our 
decision overrules prior cases sustaining 
the constitutionality of the Guest Statute, 
is insufficient to prohibit its retroactive 
application. 
Id. at 676. The plaintiff in this action has made absolutely no 
showing that he relied in any way on the Utah Product Liability 
Act statute of repose. The plaintiff has not asserted, nor 
would one expect him to reasonably assert: either (1) that he 
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first consulted tr.*:- •...*:. Product Liabi 1 ity Act befor e purchasing 
the Saab automobile -r issue here in order to determine the 
amount of yeai •- he would nave 5f*^r the purchase of the auto-
mobile to bring a cause of act • {"/,) that he rejected one 
automobile in favor of the Saab automobile because of an extended 
peri od of 1 i mitation. Furthermore, the plaintiff has not 
asserted that even after his cause of action arose, he consulted 
the Utah Product Liability Act and consciously forebore bringing 
this acta on wi thi n two years after the death of his wife because 
of the act. Of course, plaintl ff i s asserting here that lie 
relied on the limitation once he filed this action. However, 
that type of reliance is obviously an insufficient basis tc 
preclude retroactive applicati on of the Berry decision. Other-
wise, the defendants in Malan who were relying on the Guest 
Statute defense would have prevailed. Since the plaintiff has 
made no showing of his conscious reliance on the Utah Product 
Liability Act statute of repose in either purchasing his auto-
mobile or delaying the filing of this action, he has no basis to 
assert that the Berry decision should have only prospective 
effect. 
C. The plaintiff would burden the administration of justice by 
his proposal that this Court selectively apply the Berry 
decision. 
Under the plaintiff's construction of the Utah Product 
Liability Act statute of repose, each person injured by a 
product would ha v e a t.. .•*- limitation which differed from time 
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periods applicable to other persons with similar injuries 
depending on the fortuitous combination of circumstance dictated 
by the product's date of purchase, the product's date of manu-
facture, and the date of the person's injury. For example, the 
person injured on the date of purchase of a new product would 
have six years to bring his (her) action. By contrast, a person 
such as the plaintiff in Berry who was injured by a 23-year old 
product would have absolutely no time to bring his (her) cause of 
action. Between these extremes are approximately 2190 possible 
limitation periods (6 years x 3 65 days per year). 
Obviously, the plaintiff recognizes that the Berry 
decision must be retroactively applied to permit potential 
plaintiffs in Berry's position to maintain their actions. 
Accordingly, plaintiff blithely asserts that there should be 
selective retroactive application of the Berry decision exempting 
those parties who have "vested rights." Although there are cases 
in which various courts have limited their decisions to operate 
prospectively or limited their decisions retroactively only to 
the parties who brought about the overruling decision, defendants 
are unaware of any precedent by which a court has retroactively 
applied the decision to only selected parties among the parties 
in litigation at the time the overruling decision was issued. 
Plaintiff's seemingly innocuous solution to his retro-
activity problem invites the Court to engage in an ad hoc 
legislative effort. Plaintiff maintains that each injured party 
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having a cause of action a+" ^he time "the t3erry decision was 
issued has a vested right in the period mandated by the statute 
of repose* at r-anse -f action accrued. rev an 
injured party . plaintiff's position, the statute wo.-. ^ a ^ o w 
the party nearly three and one-half years b;:> bring nis (her) 
aotion, iiowever , loi partios who wfre injured by products which 
had been purchased between five and six years before the cause of 
action accrueti. tv-f- : imitation period would be less than one 
year. F:^.e to:- -- - ~; -nat: a valid statute of 
limitaticr ru<st provide - reasonable time in which an injured 
part/ ha^ **• opportunity re assert his (her) cause of action, 
Berry» * * ' *-, won] d be left with the burden 
of determining at what point prior to the expiration of the 
six-year period an injured party had had that reasonable oppor-
tnil i ty . 11 1 es sence , the p] a i nt i £f invit£s the Court t o abandon 
its role as arbiter of the constitution and rewrite ti.h- statute 
to accommodate the vagaries of a "limitations statute" which 
c -r ~ 4 *->- independent of the date of injury. 
In contrast * chaotic situation . -elective 
retrospective application would cause, a fill1 retroactive 
application of the Berry decision would1 simplify and stabilize 
the law. Under full retroactive application, each injured party 
would have the same amount of time after his (her) cause of 
action accrued in which to bring his (her) action under the 
limitations statutes prescribed i n Utah Code Ann, Section 
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78-12-1 et. seq. (1953). The benefits of certainty in the 
judicial process engendered by a fully retroactive application of 
the Berry decision far outweigh the prejudice to the plaintiff 
who delayed three and one-half years after his cause of action 
accrued before filing his complaint. 
D. The plaintiff has no vested right in an unconstitutional 
statute. 
The plaintiff has cited McClure v. Middletown Hospital 
Association, 603 F.Supp. 1365 (S.D. Ohio 1985). This, of 
course, is a federal district court decision interpreting Ohio 
state law and is not binding precedent in this action. In fact, 
McClurefs approach conflicts with the analysis which this Court 
has used in its prior decisions. 
The court in McClure based its decision on the plain-
tiff's claim to vested rights, asserting that the minor plaintiff 
should have the benefit of the law as it stood at the time of 
her birth. However, in nearly every instance where a statute 
is declared unconstitutional, one of the contesting parties can 
claim "vested rights" accorded by the statute. If the state of 
the law as it existed when the cause of action accrued always 
confers a vested interest in one of the parties litigant, it 
follows that the Court must always confine its decisions to 
prospective application. This is clearly a result which the 
Court has eschewed. For example, the defendants in Malan v. 
Lewis, 693 P. 2d 661 (Utah 1984) asserted that this Court's 
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I 
decision declaring the Guest Statute unconstitutional should be 
given only prospective effect, because at the time of the 
accident giving rise to the plaintiff's cause of action, the 
Guest Statute had been held to be constitutionally sound in 
Critchley v. Vance, 575 P.2d 187 (Utah 197(8). Although Critchlev 
was the law applicable to the party litigants when the plain-
tiff's action accrued, this Court employe4 a reasoned analysis to 
determine that its decision should be retroactively applied. 
This approach is within the broad dispretion accorded state 
courts and does not contravene the United States Constitution. 
In Great Northern Railway Cfo. v. Sunburst Oil & 
Refining Co. , 287 U.S. 358, 53 S. Ct. 1415, 77 L Ed. 360 (1932), 
the foundation case regarding retroactivity, the United States 
Supreme Court speaking through Justice Cairdozo stated: 
A state in defining the limits of adherence 
to precedent may make a choice for itself 
between the principle of forward operation 
and that of relation backward^ It may say 
that decisions of its highest court, though 
later overruled, are law nfcne the less 
for intermediate transactions. . . . On the 
other hand, it may hold to the ancient dogma 
that the law declared by its courts had a 
Platonic or ideal existence before the act of 
declaration, in which event the 
declaration will be viewed as i 
discredited 
f it had never 
been, and the reconsidered declaration as the 
law from the beginning. The alternative is 
the same whether the subject of the new 
decision is common law or statute. The 
choice for any state may be determined by the 
juristic philosophy of the judges of her 
courts, their conceptions of llaw, its origin 
and nature. We review, not the wisdom of 
their philosophies, but the legality of their 
acts. (Citations omitted.) 
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Id. at 364-65, 53 S.Ct. at 148-49, 77 L. Ed, at 366-67. This 
court's approach to retroactive application of its decisions 
is valid under the United States Constitution and defendants 
respectfully submit that such analysis impels the Court in this 
instance to retroactively apply Berry without exception. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Product Liability Act statute of repose was 
intended to confer an immunity on manufacturers and the persons 
in the manufacturers1 chain of distribution six years after 
purchase and ten years after manufacture of the product. The 
statute was never intended nor has it ever functioned as a 
statute prescribing the period during which an injured party must 
bring his cause of action after it accrues. Because the funda-
mental premise upon which the plaintiff bases his appeal is 
erroneous, the trial court's order of April 20, 1983, denying 
the defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Appendix 
A) should be reversed. However, even if the statute of repose is 
considered to be the applicable statute of limitation, the 
plaintiff has demonstrated no rational basis for his contention 
that this Court's decision in Berry should not be retroactively 
applied to him and therefore the trial court's Order of Dismissal 
entered March 20, 1986 (Appendix B) should be affirmed. 
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DATED this JQ -day of July, 1986. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
BY. 
J. Rich Humpherys ' / L
M. Douglas Bayly 
Attorneys for Defendants Saab 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS AND CROSS-APPELLANTS SAAB-SCANIA, 
INC. AND SAAB-SCANIA AB was mailed, postage prepaid, this £$ *— 
day of July, 1986, to the following: 
LeRoy S. Axland, 
Michael W. Homer 
Fred R. Silvester 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841oi-1480 
~fH £L^ &4^ 
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Srs 70 ! i t p;.i ' « 
LARRY G. REED, E s q . 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (301) 532-7300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY RAITHAUS, M.D., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
SAAB-SCANIA OF AMERICA, INC., 
a Connecticut corporation; 
KEN GARFF FOREGIN CARS, INC.; 
a Utah corporation; and SAAB-
SCANIA OF SWEDEN, a Swedish ] 
corporation, ] 
Defendants. 
) ORDER DENYING MOTION OF 
1 DEFENDANTS SAAB-SCANIA OF 
1 AMERICA AND SAAB-SCANIA OF 
> SWEDEN FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 
> PLEADINGS 
i Civil No. C 82-9672 
The Motion of Defendants Saab-Scania of America, Inc. 
and Saab-Scania of Sweden, having come on regularly for hearing 
before the above-entitled Court on the 11th day of April, 1983, 
the Honorable Judith M. Billings presiding, and the Court having 
reviewed the pleadings on file in this matter, including the Memo-
randa of Points and Authorities filed by plaintiff and said defen-
dants, and having heard the arguments and representations of counsel, 
M. Douglas Bayley, Esq., attorney for said defendants and Larry G. 
BY : = ^ t W ^ ^ S * ^ 
APPENDIX A 
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Reed, Esq., attorney for plaintiff, and it appearing to the Court 
that: 
(a) The two-year statute of limitations applicable 
to actions to recover damages for wrongful death found at 
Section 78-12-28(2), Utah Code Ann. (Replacement Vol. 9A, 
1977), is limited in its application by (Section 78-12-1, 
Utah Code Ann. (Replacement Vol. 9A, 197|7) in that in is 
applicable ". . . except where in special cases a different 
limitation is prescribed by statute", this "product liability" 
action is such a special case. The applicable statute of 
limitations is found at Section 78-15-3fl), Utah Code Ann. 
(Replacement Vol. 9A, 1977). That Sectio n, a portion of the 
Utah Product Liability Act, Section 78-JL5-1 ej:. seq. , Utah 
Code Ann,(Replacement Vol. 9A, 1977), applies specifically 
and exclusively to causes of action of the type asserted in 
plaintiff's complaint and is applicable to actions to recover 
damages for wrongful death which are ba|sed on those causes of 
action. 
(b) Principles of statutory qonstruction, specifi-
cally the preference for the application of the longer of two 
arguably applicable statutes of limitations, the principle that 
should two statutes relating to the saitie general subject matter 
be in conflict, the more specific of tlfie two will control, and 
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the principle that a later enacted statute will take prece-
dence over a prior enacted statute which pertains to the 
same general subject matter all indicate that the statute 
of limitations contained in the Utah Product Liability Act, 
rather than Section 78-12-28(2), is applicable. 
(c) The intent of the Legislature, as set forth in 
Section 78-15-2, Utah Code Ann. (Replacement Vol. 9A, 1977) 
is consistent with application of the six-year statute of 
limitations which is found at Section 78-15-3(1) and a 
contrary ruling would be inconsistent with the clear language 
of the statute. 
Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing there-
for, the Motion of Defendants Saab-Scania of America, Inc. and 
Saab-Scania of Sweden be, and the same hereby is, denied. 
DATED this ^?/ day of &>&*uJl / 1983. 
A T 7 y 3 J 
. ^ /T^/y,-w7 iAuf . The^Hbnorable Judi th ' M. B i l l i n g s 
/ Dw-jxity Ck,rk 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Order Denying Motion of Defendants Saab-Scania 
of America, Inc. and Saab-Scania of Sweden for Judgment on the 
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Pleadings was mailed, this J2£) day of April, 1983, pursuant to 
the provisions of Rule 2.9, Rules of Practice in the District 
Courts of the State of Utah, to: 
M. Douglas Bayly, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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MAR 20 1985 
L. Rich Humpherys, A1582 
M. Douglas Bayly, A0251 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS SAAB 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
StfDict Cot 
Ccrjty Cieri< 
LARRY RAITHAUS, M.D., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SAAB-SCANIA OF AMERICA, INC., 
a Connecticut corporation; 
KEN GARFF FOREIGN CARS, INC., 
a Utah corporation; and 
SAAB-SCANIA AB, a Swedish 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. C82-9672 
Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendant Saab's Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularl 
before the court on the 7th day-of March, 1986, at the hour of 
8:30 a.m. Plaintiff was represented by his counsel, Fred Silvester 
defendant Saab was represented by its counsel, L. Rich Humpherys; 
defendant Ken Garff Foreign Cars did not appear, it having pre-
viously settled its claim with the plaintiff. The court, having 
heard argument of counsel and having considered the memoranda of 
counsel, together with all other information contained in the 
court!s file granted the Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of 
defendant Saab. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's 
APPENDIX B 
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Complaint shall be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice, 
Defendant Saab shall be awarded itls costs incurred herein. 
DATED this /^O day of March, 19861. 
BY THE COURT: 
{ Judge Jqhn A. Rokich v^  Ju 
' D i s t r i c t Judge 
ATTEST 
H DIXON HINDLEY 
"2 Deputy Cterk 
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78-12-28. Within two years.—Within two years: 
(11 An action against a marshal. sheriff, constable or other officer upon 
a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his official capacity, and in 
virtue of his office, or by the omission of an official duty, including the 
nonpayment of money collected upon an execution; but this section shall 
not apply to an action for an escape. 
(2) An action to recover damages for the death of one caused by the 
wrongful act or neglect of another. 
History: L. 1951. ch. 58, §1: C. 1943. 
Supp.. 104-12-23; L. 1971, ch. 212, §1; 1976. 
ch. 23, § 13. 
APPENDIX C 
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78-15-2. Legislative findings and declarations—Ptirpose of act.—(1) 
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for 
damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from defec-
tive products has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these in-
creases, the insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of 
product liability insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and 
increased claims has increased product cost through manufacturers, whole-
salers and retailers passing the cost of premiums to the consumer. Further, 
certain product manufacturers are discouraged from continuing to provide 
and manufacture such products because of the high cost and possible un-
availability of product liability insurance. 
(2) In view of these recent trends, and for the pufpose of alleviating 
the adverse effects which these trends are producing in the manufacturing 
industry, it is necessary to protect the public interest by^  enacting measures 
designed to encourage private insurance companies to Continue to provide 
product liability insurance. 
(3) In enacting this act. it is the purpose of the legislature to provide 
a reasonable time within which actions may be commenced against manu-
facturers, while limiting the time to a specific period 'for which product 
liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; 
and to provide other procedural changes to expedite ealiy evaluation and 
settlement of claims. 
History: C. 1953, 78-15-2, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 149, § 2. 
APPENDIX D 
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78-15-3. Statute of limitations—Application.—(1) No action shall be 
brought for the recovery of damages for personal injury, death or damage 
to property more than six years after the date of initial purchase for 
use or consumption, or ten years after the date of manufacture, of a product, 
where that action is based upon, or arises out of. any of the following: 
(a) Breach of any implied warranties; 
(b) Defects in design, inspection, testing or manufacture; 
(c) Failure to warn; 
(d) Failure to properly instruct in the use of a product; or 
(e) Any other alleged defect or failure of whatsoever kind or nature in 
relation to a product. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless 
of minority or other legal disability, but shall not apply to any cause of 
action where the personal injury, death or damage to property occurs 
within two years after the effective date of this act 
History: C. 1953, 78-15-3, enacted by 
L. 1977, ciL 149, § 3. 
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